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Abstract. Although many works have been dedicated to standard pro-
tocols like Needham-Schroeder very few address the more challenging
class of group protocols. We present a synchronous model for group
protocols, that generalizes standard protocol models by permitting un-
bounded lists inside messages. In this extended model we propose a cor-
rect and complete set of inference rules for checking security properties in
presence of an active intruder for the class of well-tagged protocols. Our
inference system generalizes the ones that are implemented in several
tools for a bounded number of sessions and fixed size lists in message. In
particular when applied to protocols whose specification does not con-
tain unbounded lists our inference system provides a decision procedure
for secrecy in the case of a fixed number of sessions.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are crucial for securing electronic transactions. They
rely on cryptographic functions to ensure security properties such as secrecy or
authentication. The confidence in these protocols can be increased by a formal
analysis in order to verify that the security properties are met at least at the
logical level, that is, even when abstracting from the cryptographic functions
and considering messages as first-order terms. Verification at the logical level
is nevertheless a non-trivial task since cryptographic protocols are infinite state
systems and for instance the set of potential messages that can be generated
by an intruder is unbounded. Recently numerous works have been dedicated
to the design of automated verification tools for cryptographic protocols. Such
tools are often based on model-checking, modal logics, equational reasoning, and
resolution theorem-proving (see e.g., [Wei99,AC02,MT07]). Checking whether a
protocol is flawed in the abstract Dolev Yao model [DY83] can often be re-
duced to a constraint solving problem in a term algebra (modulo an equational
theory). This constraint-based approach has proved to be quite effective on stan-
dard benchmarks and has also permitted the discovery of new flaws in several
protocols (see e.g., [BMV03]).
⋆ This work was supported by the FP7-ICT-2007-1 Project no. 216471,
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However to our knowledge it has never been applied to the more challenging
group protocols. In fact very few formal verification results are available for such
protocols. The difficulty relates to the fact that group protocols may perform an
arbitrary number of steps since the group of communicating agents is a priori
unbounded. This allows one to encode easily undecidable problems.
Related work Several works have considered protocols with unbounded number
of participants and recursive steps. The formal analysis of such protocols goes
up with Paulson in [Pau97] who studied the Recursive Authentication (RA)
protocol [BO97] for an unbounded number of participants using Isabelle/HOL
theorem prover [Pau96]. However if the protocol is defective there is no automatic
mechanism to find the attack.
The validation of group protocols has been investigated in the CLIQUES
project [SWT98], based on group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH) protocols. Several
analysis methods have been applied in this project, from manual to automatic
ones. An interesting result has been obtained by Pereira and Quisquater [PQ03]
who found several attacks on the CLIQUES suite and have shown that it is im-
possible to design a correct authentication group key agreement protocol built
on A-GDH for a number of participants greater than three [PQ04]. Recently
Kremer and al. [KMT08] have developped an automata-based approximation
technique to analyse this class of protocols and check the absence of flaw in
presence of a passive intruder. In [MS01], the NRL protocol analyser, which
is based on a combination of model checking and theorem-proving techniques,
has been adapted to handle the GDOI’s protocols. Although Diffie-Hellman ex-
ponentiation has been encoded in the tool, it was not able to rediscover Pereira-
Quisquater attacks on the CLIQUES suite [Mea00]. Coral system [SB04] has
analysed an improved version of the multicast group key management protocol
by Tanaka and Sato [TJ03]. Two serious attacks have been found on this pro-
tocol. Coral has also discovered other attacks on Asokan-Ginzboorg [AG00] and
Iolus [Mit97] protocols.
Some works have focused on the modelling of recursive computations per-
formed by some participants (such as a server) in group protocols. In [KW04]
tree transducers are introduced to model recursion and to allow the protocol
participants to output structured messages. This work gives a decision algo-
rithm for secrecy in the case of atomic keys and bounded message size in the
Dolev Yao setting. However messages cannot be tested for equality without los-
ing decidability. Similarly using composed keys or adding equational theories for
XOR or Diffie-Hellman exponentiation in their model leads to undecidability.
In [Tru05], Truderung introduces a class of Horn clauses to model the recur-
sive behavior of participants. In this model protocol participants may receive
messages of unbounded sizes, send multiple messages in a single step, compare
and store messages. He gives a decision procedure to check whether protocols
in this model satisfy secrecy properties. His algorithm is in NEXPTIME and
is based on the derivation of an exponential bound on the size of minimal at-
tacks. Hence this nice result is rather of theoretical flavour and is not suitable
for an implementation. Only atomic keys are allowed for encryption. Moreover,
Truderung’s model cannot model some computations such as list mapping or
functional symbol mapping. Note that non-atomic keys can be handled by our
verification procedure (to be presented in the following sections). In [KT07] an
extension of [Tru05] has been proposed to handle XOR operator. Security can
then be decided for a class of recursive protocols where principals are forbidden
to XOR several messages (depending on messages) received from the network.
Another extension [KKW07] has been designed to model freshness of nonces
and keys more accurately.
Contribution. We present a synchronous model for parameterized protocols, that
can be viewed also as an extension of classical protocols model to handle uniform
lists of messages whose length is a fixed parameter. Such kind of protocols can
be found in different domains. As example, we can cite web services protocols
where lists of messages are commonly used. We can consider for instance, a basic
action of an honest participant who received a messages list whose length is not
known in advance and sends a message based on the informations he got:
〈{m1}k, .., {mi}k, .., {mn}k〉 −→ f(〈m1, .., mi, .., mn〉)
In this step, the participant decrypts the different messages composing the re-
ceived list using the public key of the sender. He then builds the message to
be sent using the list of messages mi and a function f . Note that this kind of
protocols are used in web services where messages may contain unbounded lists
of encrypted XML nodes. Moreover, our model can handle in particular, group
protocols that have an unbounded number of participants, and thus, admit this
number as a parameter. For this model we propose a complete and correct set of
inference rules that allows one to check the security of well-tagged protocols in
this class in presence of an active intruder. We show that relaxing the conditions
on well-tagged protocols leads immediately to undecidability. Moreover, the pro-
posed rules can model list mapping and allow non atomic keys. The class of
protocols that we study admits tagged messages. Tagging basically avoids some
unifications between messages that could be exploited for attacks. Several works
on protocols have considered tagging techniques on messages as ours in order to
enforce decidability. But these works ([BP03,RS03]) do not consider group pro-
tocols, or protocol with unbounded lists. Moreover in our case tagging is limited
to messages that contains indexed variables, that is variables to be instanciated
by items of unbounded lists. The other messages do not need to be tagged.
Organization of the paper. We introduce in Section 2 our protocol model. We
define attacks and show that their detection is undecidable. This motivate us to
introduce the class of well-tagged protocols that is a good candidate for decid-
able security. In Section 3, we introduce auxiliary predicates and their semantics.
They are meant to express message constructibility (from intruder knowledge)
and they are used to build constraint system whose satisfiability is equivalent
to the existence of attacks on a protocol. In Section 4, we introduce a set of
simplification rules to reduce these constraints. Finally, in Section 5, we give
an algorithm for applying these rules on a constraint system modelling a proto-
col security problem. Full details with proofs of correctness, completeness and
decidability of normalized constraints are given in a technical report [Rep].
1.1 Motivating Example: Synchronous Group Protocols
As a motivating and running example, we introduce the Asokan-Ginzboorg group
protocol which is an application level protocol. Let the group be of size n + 1
for n ≥ 1. The protocol describes the establishment of a session key between
a leader (an+1) and a random number n of participants (ai, i = 1..n). Indeed,
the leader starts the communication by sending a key (e). As a response, each
participant generates a symmetric key (ri) and a contribution to the group key
(si) and sends them encrypted under e. The group key would be f(s1, . . . , sn+1).
1. an+1 → ALL : 〈an+1, {e}p〉
2. ai → an+1 : 〈ai, {〈ri, si〉}e〉 1 ≤ i ≤ n
3. an+1 → ai : {〈s1, .., sn+1〉}ri 1 ≤ i ≤ n
4. ai → an+1 : 〈ai, {〈si, h(s1, . . . , sn+1)〉}K〉 some i, K = f(s1, . . . , sn+1)
Since here, modulo index renaming, all members of the group have identical
actions, we are going to abstract them in one agent as it shows Figure 1.1.
This Figure shows the transformation between an initial version of a protocol
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Fig. 1. Transformation to a Synchronous Protocol
towards a synchronous version. In the initial version, agents receive from the
leader some message Ri (for the agent i) and send the message Si. Messages
Ri have the same pattern, as well as messages Si. We abstract all these agents
into a single agent : the simulator who, while receiving the list of Ri represented
by the variadic list constructor mpair( , )., sends another list containing Si
represented by the same operator. This protocol is called synchronous protocol.
For our example, the simulator is called S and it simulates agents a1, . . . , an.
Agent L simulates the leader an+1. This way, we obtain below a protocol with
a fixed number of steps to the expense of introducing a variadic list constructor
mpair( , ):
1. L −→ S : mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)
2. S −→ L : mpair(i, 〈ai, {〈ri, si〉}e〉)
3. L −→ S : mpair(i, {〈mpair(j, sj), s′〉}ri)
4. S −→ L : mpair(i, 〈ai, {〈si, h(〈mpair(k, sk), s′〉)〉}f(〈mpair(k,sk),s′〉)〉)
Note that All parametric lists have the same length n.
2 The Protocol Model
We extend the protocol model [RT03] in order to deal with parametric lists
(whose length is the parameter). They are constructed with a new operator
denoted by mpair( , ). The intuition is that a mpair message is equivalent to a
list of messages built with the same pattern.
2.1 Names, Operators and Messages
Let X be a set of variables represented by capital letters. Let I be a countable
set of index variables. Let
−→
X be a set of symbols represented by overarrowed
capital letters, disjoint from X . Let XI = {Yi s.t.
−→
Y ∈
−→
X and i ∈ I} be a
countable set of (indexed) variables. Similarly, let C and
−→
C be (disjoint) sets of
symbols, represented by (overarrowed) lower case letters, and let CI = {ci s.t. c ∈
−→
C and i ∈ I}. Elements in C and CI are called constants. In this paper, terms
can be (optionally) tagged by an index. That is, let −→e ∈
−→
C be a symbol that
we reserve for tagging operations only. Then a term is an element of T in the
following language:
Ts = {T }
p
T | {T }
s
T | h(T ) | 〈T , T 〉 | mpair(I, T ) | X | XI | C | CI\{ei | i ∈ I}
T = [ei, Ts] | Ts with i ∈ I
where Ts is by definition the set of untagged terms. The operators { }p and { }s
represent asymmetric and symmetric encryptions respectively, 〈 , 〉 is a pairing
operator, h is a hash function and mpair(i, t) is a symbolic representation of a
list (or tuple) of terms, built from the common pattern t by iterating i along
integers. The translation function defined in Section 2.2 gives the semantics of
this operator. We denote by signature G the set of operators in Ts. To simplify
the syntax, in the following we will write ti instead of [ei, t], and call it a tagged
term. We also omit the tag i of a term ti, whenever the tag i is not relevant to
the discussion. We denote by Tg the set of ground terms, i.e. any term t ∈ T
with no variable in X or XI and no mpair symbol. Ground terms will be used
to describe messages that are circulated in a protocol run. Given a term t we
denote by V ar(t) (resp. Cons(t)) the set of variables (resp. constants) occuring
in t. We denote by Atoms(t) the set V ar(t) ∪ Cons(t).
In order to represent a list of terms we iterate the pairing operator 〈 , 〉.
For instance to represent a, b, c, d we can use the term 〈a, 〈b, 〈c, d〉〉〉 and we
shall write this term in a shorthand: 〈a, b, c, d〉. However we do not assume any
associativity property of pairing.
A substitution σ assigns terms to variables. A ground substitution assigns
ground terms to variables. The application of σ to a term t is written tσ. These
notations are extended to sets of terms E in a standard way: Eσ = {tσ|t ∈ E}.
The set of subterms of t is denoted by Subterm(t). It is defined recursively as
follows: If t is a variable or a constant then Subterm(t) = {t}. If t = f(t1, .., tn) or
t = f(t1, .., tn)
i with t ∈ G, then Subterm(t) = {t}∪∪ni=1Subterm(ti). Note that
u is not considered as a subterm of ui. We denote by ≤ the subterm relation on
T . We define the relation 6m over T ×T as the smallest reflexive and transitive
relation such that if t = f(t1, .., tn) or t = f(t1, .., tn)
j
with f 6= mpair, then
for all i = 1, . . . , m we have ti 6m f(t1, .., tm). Note that t 6m u implies t ≤ u.
Finally, we define two kind of Index-operations: replacements, used in the
inference rules over constraints, and substitutions, used to define the solutions
of constraints (See Section 3).
Definition 1 (Index-Replacement δ and Index-Substitution τ).
An Index-Replacement δ (resp. Index-Substitution τ) is an application from I
to I (resp. to non-negative integers) that is extended to indexed variables and
constants with δ(Xi) = Xδ(i) and δ(ci) = cδ(i) (resp. τ(Xi) = Xτ(i) and τ(ci) =
cτ(i)) and extended to terms and sets of terms in the natural way.
We will use the notations δi,j (resp. τi,j) to denote the replacement (resp. substi-
tution) of i ∈ I by j ∈ I (resp. j ∈ N). We also use δki,j to denote the replacement
of i ∈ I by j ∈ I and the other indexes apart from i by k ∈ I. We define the set
of indexes occuring in a term as follows:
Definition 2 (Term Indexes). Given a term t ∈ T , we denote by V arI(t) the
set of indexes in t, recursively defined as follows:
V arI(mpair(i, t)) = V arI(X) = V arI(c) = ∅ with X ∈ X and c ∈ C
V arI(Xi) = V arI(ci) = {i} with Xi ∈ XI and ci ∈ CI
V arI(f(t1, .., tn)) = V arI(t1) ∪ .. ∪ V arI(tn) otherwise
V arI(t
i) = V arI(t) ∪ {i}
2.2 Protocol Specification, Intruder and attacks
A protocol is given by a set of principals and a finite list of steps for each.
We associate to each principal A a partially ordered finite set (WA, <WA) steps
Rι ⇒ Sι where Rι is an expected message and Sι his reply. Init and End are
fixed messages used to initiate and close a protocol session. Our notion of correct
execution of a protocol session (or protocol run) follows [RT03].
We follow the intruder model of Dolev and Yao [DY83]. The actions of the
intruder are simulated by a sequence of rewrite rules on sets of messages. These
rules are defined as follows. We note −→∗DY their reflexive and transitive closure.
Decompositition Rules
Ld(〈a1, . . . , an〉) : 〈a1, . . . , an〉 →
a1, . . . , an, 〈a1, . . . , an〉
Ld({a}
p
K) : {a}
p
K, K
−1 → {a}pK , K
−1, a
Ld({a}sK) : {a}
s
K, b → {a}
s
K , b, a
Ld(t
i) : ti → t
Compositition Rules
Lc(〈a1, . . . , an〉) : a1, . . . , an →
a1, . . . , an, 〈a1, . . . , an〉
Lc({a}
p
K) : a, K → a, K, {a}
p
K
Lc({a}sK) : a, b → a, b, {a}
s
K
Lc(t
i) : t → ti for any i ∈ I
Definition 3 (Non-Redundant Derivation). Let D = E0−→L1 . . .−→LlEl
be a derivation such that u ∈ El and ∀i < l u /∈ Ei. We call u a goal of D
and we note D as Du(E0). D is a non redundant derivation if ∀i ∀t ∈ Ei, if
Lc(t) ∈ D then ∄Ld( ) ∈ D that generates t, and if ∃Ld( ) ∈ D generating t then
Lc(t) /∈ D. We denote by NRD the set of non-redundant derivations.
Remark 1. For each derivation Dt(E), there exists a non redundant derivation
D′t(E). Indeed, D
′ is obtained by elimination of Lc(t) if Ld( ) ∈ D where Ld( )
generates t and by eliminating each Ld( ) ∈ D that generates t if Lc(t) ∈ D.
We define a predicate Dy. This predicate checks whether a message can be
constructed by the intruder from some known messages.
Definition 4 (Dy, Dyc and Dyd). Let E and K be sets of ground terms and
t be a ground term such that there exists D ∈ NRD with goal t without de-
composing any term of K. Then, we say that t is forged from E and we denote
it by t ∈ Dy(E,K). Moreover, if D = D′.Lc(t) then t ∈ Dyc(E,K), otherwise
t ∈ Dyd(E,K).
We interpret the mpair( , ) operator in the standard Dolev-Yao signature by
defining a translation function that replaces any mpair by a sequence of pair
applications. The number of such applications is given as a parameter e to the
translation function. The integer represents the common length of lists of terms
represented by any mpair(, ).
Definition 5 (Translation of terms). Let TDY be the set of terms without
any mpair(, ). Given any integer e and function f 6= mpair, the function −e
from T to TDY is defined as follows:
mpair(i, t)
e
= 〈τi,1(t)
e
, .., τi,e(t)
e
〉 and f(s1, .., sk)
e
= f(s1
e, .., sk
e)
We can now define attacks on protocols in our model, based on Dy predicate.
Definition 6 (Attack). Given a protocol execution P = {Ri ⇒ Si|i = 1, .., k},
a secret Sec and assuming the intruder has as initial knowledge S0, an attack is
described by a ground substitution σ, an Index-Substitution τ , and an integer e,
such that ∀i = 1, . . . , k, we have:
Riτσ
e
∈ Dy(S0
e
, S1
e
τσ, . . . , Si−1
e
τσ, ∅)
Sec
e
∈ Dy(S0
e
, S1
e
τσ, . . . , Sk
e
τσ, ∅)
2.3 Undecidability and Well-Tagged Protocols
Unfortunately, the insecurity problem (i.e. the existence of an attack) is unde-
cidable in the general case. This can be shown by encoding Post Correspondance
Problem (PCP) with two letters. Note that this encoding requires only atomic
keys.
Definition 7 (PCP protocol). Let J = {(α1, β2) , .., (αp, βp)} be an instance
of PCP on the alphabet {a, b}. We define the protocol specification P (J) coding
J as the following, with C = {a, b, 0, t, u}, X = {Z},
−→
X =
{−→
A,
−→
B,
−→
X,
−→
Y
}
and
only one honest participant :
1. Init ⇒ a, b, 0, {〈0, 0〉}t
2. mpair(i, 〈Ai, Bi〉) ⇒ mpair(i, {〈Ai, Bi〉}t)
3. mpair(i, {〈Xi, Yi〉}t) ⇒ mpair(i, {〈α1 (Xi) , β1 (Yi)〉}u), . . .
mpair(i, {〈αp (Xi) , βp (Yi)〉}u)
4. mpair(i, {〈Ai, Bi〉}u), {〈Z, Z〉}u ⇒ Sec
Theorem 1. An instance J of PCP has a solution iff P (J) has an attack on
Sec.
The proof of this theorem is detailed in technical report [Rep]. We will therefore
introduce the class of Well-Tagged protocols for which decidability is expected.
To do this, we first introduce the notion of autonomy:
Definition 8 (Autonomy). A term mpair(i, u) is sayed to be autonomous
when V arI(u) ⊆ {i}. A term t ∈ TDY is autonomous if #V arI(t) ≤ 1 and
∀t′ < t, t′ is autonomous. A protocol P = {Rı ⇒ Sı|ı ∈ J} is autonomous iff for
all ı ∈ J , Rı and Sı are autonomous and V arI(Rı) = ∅ and V arI(Sı) = ∅.
For instance, the term t = mpair(i, mpair(j, {ai}cj)) is not autonomous. We re-
mark that the autonomy property alone is not enough to guarantee decidability,
since the PCP protocol of Definition 7 is autonomous.
Definition 9 (Well-Tagged protocols). P = {Rı ⇒ Sı|ı ∈ J} is Well-
Tagged iff:
1. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀Xi ∈ XI ∩ Subterm(Rı) ∩
⋃
ı′<ı Subterm(Rı′), Xi is tagged;
2. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀Xi ∈ XI ∩ Subterm(Sı), Xi is tagged;
3. ∀ı ∈ J , ∀t = f(s1, .., sk) ∈ Subterm(Sı) with f 6= mpair, if ∃j = 1..k s.t. sj
is tagged, then t is tagged too;
4. P is autonomous.
In this definition, Conditions 1 and 2 state that any indexed variable of the
protocol must be tagged, except for its first occurrence w.r.t. the partial step
ordering. Moreover, Condition 3 (when combined with Condition 2) states that,
for any subterm t of some acquired intruder knowledge Sı, if an indexed variable
is accessible from t by decompositions without opening any mpair, then t must
be tagged. Note that as a consequence of mpair autonomy, an indexed variable
Xi can only be tagged by its index (as in Xi
i) or untagged.
The idea underlying the tagging of variables is to add enough information on
terms in mpair so that the protocol cannot be used to test or ensure relations
between elements of the same mpair, such as ∀i = 2..n, ∃i′ = 1..n s.t. Xi =
f(Xi′). This is precisely the kind of relations that the encoding of PCP is able
to exploit. Thus, adding tags to the PCP-encoding protocol will generate a new
protocol that cannot be run.
3 Constraints for Protocol Verification
We will use a symbolic constraint system to represent all runs of a protocol given
a step ordering. This system uses (universal or existential) quantifiers on index
variables and includes an (implicit) universal quantification on the number n of
elements in any mpair. Before defining our constraint system, some basic notions
have to be introduced. For terms s, s′ (resp. sets of terms E, E′) we note s ∼ s′
(resp. E ∼ E′) if they are equal once we erase their tags.
Definition 10 (Relation 6LE for accessible subterms). We consider a re-
lation 6 on T ×2T ×2T ×T . We write s6LEt for s, t terms in T and E and L
finite subsets of T . Note that this can be used for Ts too. This relation is defined
as the smallest relation such that:
t6∅∅t ∀t ∈ T
s6LEt iff s
′6L
′
E′t
′ where s ∼ s′, t ∼ t′, E ∼ E′, L ∼ L′
If {m}pk6
L
Et then m6
L′
E,k−1
t where L′ = L ∪ {{m}pk}
If {m}sb6
L
Et then m6
L′
E,bt where L
′ = L ∪ {{m}sb}
If 〈t1, . . . , tn〉6LEt then ∀i ≤ n, ti6
L′
E t where L
′ = L ∪ {〈t1, . . . , tn〉}
If m6LE′t and E
′ ⊂ E then m6LEt
We write u6Et when u6
L
Et for some L. Note that by construction, u6Et implies
u ∈ Subterm(t). We say that u is a subterm of t that is accessible, i.e. can
be obtained from t by decompositions using keys in E. For simplicity, we note
6b1,..,bk instead of 6{b1,..,bk}. We define also the set of strict accessible terms by
s<F t (resp. s<
L
F t) if s6F t (resp. s6
L
F t) and s 6= t. Given t 6
L
F u or t <
L
F u), we
call length of t 6LF u or (resp t <
L
F u) the number of elements of L.
Before defining constraint systems, we need to introduce the environment
and elementary constraints.
Definition 11 (Environment). We call an environment a finite set of equali-
ties X = u whose left-hand sides are variables (X ∈ X ∪XI). We usually denote
it by E.
Definition 12 (Elementary Constraint). An elementary constraint is an ex-
pression (t = t′), (t ∈ Forge(E,K)), (t ∈ Forgec(E,K)), (t ∈ Sub(t′, E, E ,K)),
or (t ∈ Subd(t
′, E, E ,K)) with an environment E, t, t′ ∈ T and E ⊂ T .
An elementary constraint represents a basic relation on terms. Indeed, t ∈
Forge(E,K) if the term t is derivable from the knowledge E without decom-
posing elements of K; t ∈ Forgec(E,K) if t is derived by composition; t ∈
Sub(t′, E, E ,K) if t is an accessible subterm from t′ with knowledge E with none
of the intermediate terms between t and t′ in K, and this modulo replacements
using equations of E ; t ∈ Subd(t′, E, E ,K) if t is accessible by decomposition of
t′, also modulo replacements using E ; and t = t′ if t and t′ are equal.
Definition 13 (Negative Constraint). A negative constraint is an expression
(∀i Xm 6= u) or (Xm /∈ Forgec(E,K)) with Xm ∈ XI, u ∈ T , E, E′ ⊂ T and
i ∈ V arI(u).
The set of solutions of a constraint S, denoted by |[ S ]|eτ where e is a value of n
and τ is an Index-Substitution is a set of ground substitutions to be defined in
the following. We define GS to be the set of all ground substitutions.
Definition 14 (Solutions of an Elementary Constraint).
|[ t = t′ ]|eτ = {σ ∈ GS | t
e
τσ = t′
e
τσ}
|[ t ∈ Forge(E,K) ]|eτ = {σ ∈ GS | t
e
τσ ∈ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)}
|[ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ = {σ ∈ GS | t
e
τσ ∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)}
|[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|eτ =
{σ ∈ GS | ∃u ∃F, L s.t. u 6LF w
eτ, Fσ ⊆ Dy(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ),
Lσ ∩ K
e
τσ = ∅, and either uσ = t
e
τσ or ∃v, δ, k, τ ′ s.t














either u ∈ X , (u = v) ∈ E , δ = ∅, and τ ′ = τ
or ∃
−→
Z ∈
−→
X , i, j ∈ I s.t u = Ziτ ′, (Zj = v) ∈ E ,
or δ = δkj,i, τ ⊆ τ
′ and Dom(τ ′) = Dom(τ) ∪ {k, i}
k, i /∈ V arI({t, w, E}), uσ /∈ Dyc(E
e
τσ,K
e
τσ)
uσ = veδτ ′σ, and σ ∈ |[ t ∈ Sub(vδ, E, E ,K) ]|eτ ′∪{k, i}}
|[ t ∈ Subd(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ is defined in a similar way as |[ t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K) ]|
e
τ
with the difference that for the first case (when uσ = t
e
τσ), we have u <LF w
eτ .
Definition 15 (Solutions of a Negative Constraint).
|[ Xm /∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ = GS \ |[ Xm ∈ Forgec(E,K) ]|
e
τ
|[ (∀i Xm 6= u) ]|
e
τ = GS \
⋃
x=1...e
|[ Xm = u ]|
e
[i←x],τ
We describe our constraint system by blocks in the following way:
Definition 16 (Constraint System). First, we define a constraints block B
as a conjunction of constraints together with an environment E: B = (ctr1 ∧
. . . ∧ ctrl, E). We will sometimes handle blocks as set of elementary or negative
constraints for ease of notations. For instance we write c ∈ B to express that the
elementary constraint c is a conjunct of B.
We can now define the constraint system that we will use to represent protocol
runs. Given two finite lists of index variables Q = i1, . . . , ik and R = j1, . . . , jl,
we write the quantifier prefix ∀i1 · · · ∀ik∃j1 · · · ∃jl in short: ∀Q ∃R. A constraint
system, denoted by S, is a disjunction of blocks with a quantifier prefix: S =
∀Q ∃R (B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bp)
Now, we define the set of solutions of the constraint system as follows:
Definition 17 (Solutions of the Constraint System). Consider a con-
straint system S, Bi, for i = 1 . . . p (blocks of S) and ctri,j , for j = 1 . . . li
(constraints of the block Bi) given in Definition 16. The set of solutions of a
constraint system CS is defined inductively using the following cases:
|[ ∀i S ]|eτ = ∩x=1,...,e|[ S ]|
e
[i←x],τ |[S ]|
e
τ =
⋃
i=1...p
|[ Bi ]|
e
τ
|[ ∃i S ]|eτ = ∪x=1,...,e|[ S ]|
e
[i←x],τ |[Bi ]|
e
τ =
⋂
j=1...li
|[ ctri,j ]|
e
τ
The idea will be to use a constraint system based on blocks to represent
all possible ways the intruder can construct a list of terms represented by an
mpair. Roughly, there will be one block in the system for each way. Note also
that blocks are extended to admit labeled constraints:
Notation 1 (labels of constraints)
A constraint ctr may be equiped with a label (ctr)m or (ctr)sm or (ctr)f to denote
respectively a master constraint or a submaster constraint or a final constraint.
The two first labels allow us to keep track of the “official” formal value of some
indexed or non-indexed variable. For example, we will prove that we have ex-
actly one master constraint for every indexed variable in each block, and we will
use master or sub master constraints to instanciate variables when needed; The
third label will be used to prevent any further rewriting on some constraint. We
introduce also the notation (ctr) to refer to labeled or non labeled constraint.
The solutions of labeled constraints are the solutions of the constraints obtained
by removing labels.
To simplify the use of (sub)master constraints, we group them into sets:
Definition 18 (Set of (sub)master constraints). Let S = ∀Q∃R B1∨..∨Bp
be a constraint system, Y ∈ X , W ⊆ X and
−→
X ∈
−→
X . We define M(S,
−→
X ) =
{ctr | ∃i (ctr)m ∈ Bi and ∃j ∈ Q such that ctr = (Xj ∈ Forgec(E,K)) or
ctr = (Xj = u)} and ∀i SM(Bi, W ) = {ctr | (ctr)sm ∈ Bi, ctr = (Y = u) and
Y ∈ W}. Also, SM(Bi, Y ) = SM(Bi, {Y }).
When S is clear from the context we omit it in M(S,
−→
X ) and write simply
M(
−→
X ).
4 Normalisation of a Constraint System
In this section we present the rules applied in the normalization function over
constraint systems. The result of applying a rule is put in disjunctive normal
form and existential quantifiers are moved up to the prefix of the system using
first order logic. These rules are organized in six groups G1, . . . , G6.
G1 aims at maintaining syntactic properties over a constraint system. Some
rules handle labelling of master constraints by adding new labels or transfering
existing ones. We call them respectively the labelling and the label transfer rules.
Other rules format constraints in order to get preferably variables on their left
hand-side, or replace indexed variables by non-indexed ones.
G2 contains the Forge rules. Here, we have for example :
t ∈ Forge(E,K) −→ t ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∨
∨
w∈E
t ∈ Sub(w, E, E ,K)
This generic rule illustrates the two possible ways for forging a term t: either by
composing or by decomposing one of the knowledge. The other rules enumerate
all possible ways a term can be composed by the Intruder: we have exactly one
rule for decomposing each kind of operator in the signature G. In particular, there
is one rule for the mpair operator where mpair autonomy is used to justify the
quantification.
G3 contains the Sub rules. These rules are similar to the Forge ones, but
they decompose Intruder knowledge. In this group, there is a generic rule :
t ∈ Sub(u, E, E ,K) −→ (t = u) if u ∈ K
(t = u) ∨ (t ∈ Subd(u, E, E ,K)) otherwise
This rule follows precisely the intruder deduction rules: a term t is an accessible
subterm of u iff t = u or there exists a direct subterm u′ of u, derivable from u,
with t being an accessible subterm of u′. Therefore, there exists exactly one rule
for decomposing each kind of operator in G (apart from variables and constants).
G4 encodes unification algorithm for terms in our system, and thus, the
resolution of equality constraints. These rules simply consist in testing recursively
the compatibility of each top operator in each term. Therefore, the only equality
constraints remaining after an iteration of these rules are those assigning a value
to a variable, i.e. X = u with X ∈ X ∪ XI . The goal of G5 and G6 is to replace
variables by managing interactions between constraints.
G5 aims at replacing variables by their value, inside one block and inde-
pendently of other blocks. Consequently, these rules only consider multiple oc-
curences of the same variable, with the same index in case of indexed variable.
For instance, the interaction between two Equality constraints is managed by
Rules 26 and 27 for respectively indexed and non indexed variables.
B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 −→ B ∧ (Xi = u)
 ∧ (Xi = v)
 ∧ u = v (26)
(X = u)sm ∧ (X = v) −→ (X = u)sm ∧ (u = v) (27)
Besides, interaction for Forge and Sub constraints is managed as follows:
A ∈ Forgec(E,K) ∧ t ∈ Subd(A, E
′, E ,K) −→ ⊥ where A ∈ X ∪ XI
This rule says that it is not necessary to decompose a variable. While a bit more
complex than expected, our semantics of Subd(, , ,) has been defined to prevent
useless actions like this, thus ensuring the validity of G6.
G6 generalizes G5 by allowing variable replacements from one block to an
other one. Given a constraint containing a variable Xi that must be replaced by
its value, we enumerate a finite number of ”candidate” terms representing all
possible values of this variable according to the whole constraint system. These
values are provided by master constraints. For instance, the interleaving between
a Sub constraint with contraints of other blocks leads to the following rule:
t ∈ Subd(Xm, E
′, E ,K) −→
∨
(Xi = u)∈E
∃k′ t ∈ Sub(uδ, E′, E ,K) ∧ (Xm = uδ)
f
∧Xm /∈ Forgec(E
′,K)with δ = δk
′
i,m
In this rule, only the case where master constraints are equality ones are taken
into account since the interleaving with Forge ones leads to ⊥. This rule adds
an (extra) equality representing the master constraint it used, but labeled final
to prevent further reductions on it. It adds also negative constraints to eliminate
the case of Forge master constraints.
Rules System with Tags We have defined our Rules system for constraints on
untagged terms. Nevertheless, these rules deal also with tagged terms following
the definition of our signature. For example, the equality constraint (Xi)
i = u
leads to ⊥ when u is untagged, since (Xi)i = [ei, Xi].
Definition 19 (Solved Constraint). A solved constraint is of type: (Xi = u)

,
(X = u)sm, (Xi ∈ Forgec(E,K))

, X ∈ Forgec(E,K), (Y /∈ Forgec(E,K)), or
(∀j Xi 6= u) where X ∈ X , Y ∈ X ∪ XI , Xi ∈ XI, u ∈ T , j ∈ V arI(u), E ⊂ T
and K ⊂ T .
We will prove that at each step of our algorithm, the normalized constraint
system contains only solved constraints.
Application to the Asokan-Ginzboorg Protocol
Let us Focus on the following step of the Asokan-Ginzboorg specification:
mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) where E1 = {mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉)}.
−→ (mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Forgec(E1, ∅))
∨(mpair(i, 〈L, {Ei}p〉) ∈ Sub(mpair(t, 〈l, {e}p〉), E1, ∅, ∅)) by G2
−→∗ ∀i ∀j ((L ∈ Forge(E1, ∅) ∧ (Ei = e)m) ∨ ((L = l)sm ∧ (Ei = e)m)
∨((L = l)sm ∧ (Ej = e)m)) by G1
5 Well-tagged Protocol Verification
We introduce here the verification algorithm and the results that state the cor-
rectness and the completeness of the inference rules of Section 4 and decidability
for protocols without mpair(, )’s and indexed variables. Given a set R of infer-
ence rules and a formula F we say that R(F ) is a closure of F by R if it is
derived by a finite number of applications of rules in R and no rule can be fur-
ther applied to R(F ). First of all, we define a reduction of equalities chain in an
environment:
Notation 2 (⌈E⌉) We note ⌈E⌉ the closure of E by the following rules:
X = Y ∧ Y = u −→ X = u ∧ Y = u
Xi = Yi ∧ Yj = u −→ Xi = uδk
′
Q,i ∧ Yj = u
for X, Y ∈ X ∪ XI , Xi, Yj ∈ XI and u /∈ X ∪ XI .
Second, we introduce the normalisation function denoted by S 7→ (S)

y. A nor-
malisation of a constraint system can be defined when some closures can be
computed as follows using a subset of the inference rules. This normalization
operates in two main phases:
Definition 20 (Normalization function). Let S be a block system. We de-
note by SR the whole set of inference rules except the labelling rule. We assume
that we can compute:
Phase 1: S1, a closure of S through SR except Rules 26 and 27;
Labelling: S2, a closure of S1 through the labelling and label transfer rules;
Phase 2: S3, a closure of S2 through SR. This closure is denoted by(S)

y.
The Labelling step adds labels for creating master constraints, making sure
to always favour labelling of equality constraints to a forge constraints. While
Phases 1 and 2 are similar by the rules they use, their behaviors differ: when
used in our algorithm for a step Ri ⇒ Si, Phase 1 will never use any constraint
interleaving rule with a master constraint M(
−→
X ) with L(X) = Ei−1. This means
that during Phase 1, the variables with maximum level cannot be replaced yet
from a block to an other, simply because none of them have master constraints
yet. However, the second phase do not have this limitation. The verification
algorithm is the following:
Algorithm 1 Let P = {Ri ⇒ Si|i = 1..k} be Well-Tagged, Sec ∈ T , Rk+1 ,
Sec and S0 ⊂ Tg.
1. Let CBS0 , ∀Q ∃R⊤, with Q = R = ∅, be the initial constraint system.
2. For i from 1 to k + 1 :
(a) Assume that CBSi−1 , ∀Q∃R B1 ∨ B2 ∨ .. ∨ Bp;
(b) Let ctri , Ri ∈ Forge(S0, S1, .., Si−1, ∅);
(c) Let Ei =
⋃
−→
X
M(CBSi−1,
−→
X ) and for all j = 1, ..p, X, Y ∈ X ∪ XI ,
Ei,j = ⌈Ei ∪ SM(Bj ,X )⌉\{(X = Y )};
(d) Let CBSi , (∀Q∃R (B1 ∧ ctri, Ei,1) ∨ .. ∨ (Bp ∧ ctri, Ei,p) )

y
3. Test Satisfiability of CBSk+1 (return insecure iff satisfiable).
Note that sets Ei, Ei,j denotes respectively the set of master constraints for vector
variables and the set of submaster constraints for variables of block Bj , both
with variables of level strictly included in Ei−1. Notation ⊤ represents true. The
algorithm chooses a “possible” protocol run represented by π, and tests if after
this run Sec is derivable by the intruder for some length e of mpair(, ). We test
this by increasing the initial constraint system CBS0 with each protocol step
successively, and by normalising the resulting constraint system at each step.
This step-by-step normalisation is required by our inference rules which assumes
that master and sub-master constraints for previous steps have been already
computed. Since we will show that the normalisation preserves the semantics,
|[ CBSk+1 ]|
e
∅ 6= ∅ iff the protocol run defined by π has an attack. Thus, assuming
the next lemmas, the correctness of the algorithm follows:
Lemma 1. (Correctness and Completeness of Normalization)
Let CBSi and ctri (i = 1..k + 1) be as in the verification algorithm, for some
Well-tagged protocol P . Then for all e,
|[ CBSi−1 ∧ ctri ]|
e
∅ =
∣
∣
[
(CBSi−1 ∧ ctri)

y
]∣
∣
e
∅
Lemma 2. (Satisfiability of normalised form)
If Algorithm 1 terminates for a subclass of Well-Tagged protocols, then the sat-
isfiability of a normalised constraint system resulting from a protocol in this
subclass is decidable.
Theorem 2. (Analysis of Well-tagged Protocols)
If Algorithm 1 terminates for a subclass of Well-Tagged protocols, then, the in-
security problem is decidable for this subclass.
Full proofs can be found in Technical report [Rep]. Moreover, it is worth to
notice that our algorithm always terminates for protocols without mpair(, ), thus
showing that our procedure is an extension of protocol analysis in the basic case.
The proof of termination for protocols without mpair(, ) and without indexed
variables can be found in Technical report [Rep].
6 Conclusion and Further Works
We have proposed an extension of the constraint-based approach in symbolic
protocol verification in order to handle a class of protocols (the well-tagged
ones) which admit unbounded lists in messages. This class can be used to model
in particular interesting group protocols. We conjecture that adding adequate
control on our constraint simplication rules allows one to obtain termination of
the constraint normalization process and therefore to derive a decision procedure
for an interesting subclass of well-tagged protocols.
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